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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE, AND THE PROBLEM WITH 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW UNDER THE OHIO CONSTITUTION 
Corey Bushle* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
While the United States Supreme Court’s divinations of the United 
States Constitution dominate national news headlines and capture the 
popular attention, state courts often get the proverbial short end of the 
stick. But in the United States, the federal Constitution provides only the 
bare minimum required protection that the states must afford their 
citizens. There are in fact fifty other constitutions—state constitutions—
that each have independent force. Each of these fifty state constitutions 
contain individual rights guarantees of their own. State courts can, and 
often do, choose to interpret their constitutions differently—and 
sometimes as more expansive in protecting rights—than the Supreme 
Court does in construing the United States Constitution.  
The Constitution’s Bill of Rights contains provisions that are echoed in 
most state constitutions, sometimes verbatim. The Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is no exception. 
Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution is a near word-for-word 
copy of the Fourth Amendment. Regardless, our federal system of 
government empowers state courts to interpret their own Constitutions 
and laws without regard to the Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
United States Constitution, if they so desire. However, the Supreme Court 
of Ohio, like many state courts, often struggles to interpret the state search 
and seizure provision independently because of the provision’s near-
identical language to its overbearing federal counterpart. Whether caused 
by perceptions of federal supremacy, inadequate briefing by litigants, 
efficiency concerns, or judicial restraint, many state courts are highly 
deferential to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution—even when construing their states’ independent 
provisions.  
This Comment discusses search and seizure jurisprudence under the 
Ohio Constitution’s independent authority, with special attention to the 
evolution of the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule is a judicially 
created rule that prohibits the government from using illegally seized 
evidence and illegal arrests at trial to prosecute citizens in violation of 
their Constitutional rights. Part II begins by recounting the rise and fall of 
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the exclusionary rule’s scope under the Fourth Amendment, based on the 
value considerations and interest-balancing conducted by the Justices of 
the Supreme Court of the United States. It then describes the Supreme 
Court of Ohio’s approach to search and seizure law and the exclusionary 
rule under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution by focusing on a 
few recent, seminal cases in this area. Part III discusses the lack of 
internally consistent reasoning put forth by the Supreme Court of Ohio in 
those cases. The discussion will draw attention to the lack of a clear 
rationale by the Supreme Court of Ohio when choosing to either 
harmonize with or depart from federal Fourth Amendment cases.  
Ultimately, this Comment concludes that the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 
purported practice of “harmonizing” Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio 
Constitution with the Fourth Amendment unless “persuasive reasons” 
justify otherwise, offers no meaningful guidance to litigants who wish to 
argue that the Ohio Constitution should offer greater protections than the 
Fourth Amendment, and argues that the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 
rejection of persuasive reasoning in a recent case puts Article I, Section 
14 of the Ohio Constitution at risk of becoming meaningless or redundant.   
II. BACKGROUND 
While the idea that the government should not benefit from its own 
constitutional violations is well-trodden legal ground, the rule excluding 
evidence obtained in illegal searches and seizures is not grounded in the 
text of the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment provides that “the 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”1 From the text 
alone, it is clear that the government may not “unreasonably” search or 
seize persons, papers, and effects. It does not necessarily follow from this, 
however, that the remedy for a violation of this right is to prevent the 
government from introducing illegally seized evidence at trial. That rule, 
known as the exclusionary rule, developed primarily in the federal courts 
and later spread to the states, who adopted it both voluntarily and 
involuntarily over the course of the early Twentieth Century. Ohio was 
one such state that involuntarily adopted the exclusionary rule, doing so 
only after the U.S. Supreme Court held that the rule applied to the states 
via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. This section will 
describe the development of the rule, some key exceptions articulated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, and describe Ohio case law interpreting Article 
I, Section 14 relative to the Fourth Amendment. 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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A. The Origin of the Federal Exclusionary Rule 
The exclusionary rule has its origins in the United States Supreme 
Court’s 1914 decision in Weeks v. United States.2 There, the Court 
reversed the conviction of a suspected gambler after police searched his 
home without a warrant and seized various papers containing evidence of 
his alleged offense.3 In so holding, the Court reasoned that law 
enforcement’s then-existing tendency to “obtain convictions by means of 
unlawful seizures . . . should find no sanction in the judgment of the 
courts, which are charged at all times with the judgment of the 
Constitution . . . .”4 In other words, the Court held that courts should not 
admit evidence which was obtained in violation of the Constitution they 
are bound to uphold.  
For several decades following Weeks, the rule applied only to the 
federal government. In Wolf v. Colorado,5 the Court declined to use the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the 
exclusionary rule against state governments. While the Court recognized 
that the right of security against arbitrary police intrusion is both basic to 
a free society and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, thereby 
making the right applicable against the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the Court questioned whether the 
mandatory exclusion of logically relevant evidence seized in violation of 
that right was a necessary component to the protection of the right.6 
The opinion in Wolf contains a survey of the states’ attitudes towards 
the exclusionary rule—dubbed the “Weeks doctrine”—cataloguing state 
courts’ considerations of the rule before and after Weeks was decided.7 
The results are a study in the influence the Supreme Court commands over 
state courts, even on nonbinding issues: of the twenty-six states that 
anticipated the exclusionary rule before Weeks, only one state—Iowa—
adopted the rule.8 Of the states to consider adopting the exclusionary rule 
after Weeks, however, six states chose to adopt the rule while fourteen 
states rejected it.9 Additionally, ten states chose to overrule their pre-
Weeks decisions and adopt the exclusionary rule.10 All in all, in 1949, the 
number of states who adopted the exclusionary rule (thirty-one) nearly 
 
 2. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 3. Id. at 386. 
 4. Id. at 392. 
 5. 338 U.S. 25, 33 (1949). 
 6. Id. at 28. 
 7. Id. at 34-39. 
 8. State v. Sheridan, 96 N.W. 730 (Iowa 1903). 
 9. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29. 
 10. Id. 
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doubled the number who had not adopted it (sixteen).11 The Court in Wolf 
reasoned that this divide represented a healthy disagreement, and that 
other remedies for police misconduct could serve just as well as the 
exclusionary rule to deter constitutional violations.12  
The underlying premise of Wolf—that remedies other than the 
exclusion of otherwise relevant evidence could prove just as effective in 
deterring police misconduct—faced closer scrutiny just over a decade 
later when the Court decided Mapp v. Ohio.13 There the Court held that 
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of unlawfully seized 
evidence in state court to the same extent that such evidence is prohibited 
in federal court.14 Expressly overruling Wolf, the Court again surveyed 
the states’ attitudes towards the exclusionary rule. Given that the rule 
existed to deter police violations of the rights protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court reasoned, whether the exclusionary rule is a 
fundamental aspect of the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment 
depends in no small part on how effective other remedies are at 
vindicating those rights.15 This time around, the Court found that the 
states were warming to the exclusionary rule. Most notably, the Court 
quoted a California decision overruling that state judiciary’s prior 
rejection of the Weeks doctrine, wherein the California court observed that 
other remedies had “completely failed” to secure police compliance with 
the Fourth Amendment’s mandates.16  
This growing consensus among the states that exclusion was the only 
effective remedy to deter police misconduct was key in bolstering the 
Court’s rationale in overruling Wolf.  According to the Court, having 
states fail to vindicate the rights guaranteed under the Constitution created 
“needless conflict” between state and federal courts.17 The Court 
reasoned that applying the exclusionary rule to the states would avoid 
such conflict.18 It made little sense to the Court that a prosecutor in a state 
proceeding could introduce evidence that his counterpart across the street 
in the federal courthouse would be forbidden to admit under the 
restrictions of the very same amendment.19 From its creation in 1914 to 
the present, the exclusionary rule reached its peak—in scope and state 
court endorsement resulting from the dicta of the Court—in Mapp. In the 
following years, the framing of the exclusionary rule and its scope in 
 
 11. Id. at 30. 
 12. Id. at 31-33. 
 13. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 14. Id. at 655. 
 15. Id. at 656. 
 16. Id. at 651-52. 
 17. Id. at 657-58 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 657. 
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several landmark decisions chipped away at the foundation laid by the 
Court in Mapp. 
B. The Court cools on the exclusionary rule. 
In contrast with the warm language praising the exclusionary rule’s 
protections in Mapp, a majority of the Court in subsequent years would 
temper the rule’s scope and call its efficacy into question. In United States 
v. Janis, a federal civil tax proceeding, the Court considered whether the 
exclusionary rule should prohibit the introduction of evidence seized 
based on a constitutionally deficient warrant—the catch being that the 
rule that made the warrant “deficient” had only been announced by the 
Court weeks prior to the seizure in question.20 The police in Janis 
obtained a warrant to search the home of a suspected bookmaker by 
submitting an affidavit of an officer relying on the statements of 
informants.21 Based on that warrant, officers arrested the defendant and 
seized records as well as several thousand dollars in suspected proceeds 
of illegal gambling.22 The defendant in Janis moved to quash the warrant 
and suppress the proceeds of the search based on a recently-decided 
Supreme Court decision which held that an affidavit is defective under 
the Fourth Amendment when it does not sufficiently allow the magistrate 
issuing the warrant to assess the reliability of an informant.23 The trial 
court “reluctantly” held that the affidavit, and therefore the warrant, was 
insufficient under current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and quashed 
the subpoena.24 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.25  
On review, the Court held in Janis that the evidence seized in reliance 
on the invalid warrant should not be excluded.  This decision laid the 
foundation for the primary exception to the exclusionary rule: the “good 
faith exception.” Under the good faith exception, when an officer 
executes a search in good faith reliance on a warrant that later turns out 
to be constitutionally defective, the evidence should not be suppressed.26 
The Court based this on the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule 
laid out in Mapp.27 The framing of the exclusionary rule in Janis is 
striking in the begrudging language the Court employs. By referring to 
the rule as a “late judicial creation,” Justice Blackmun seems to subtly 
 
 20. 428 U.S. 433, 448 (1976). 
 21. Id. at 434-36. 
 22. Id. at 434-35. 
 23. Id. at 438 (citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1976)). 
 24. Id.at 439. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 447. 
 27. Id. 
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attempt to persuade the reader of the rule’s illegitimacy as a Constitutional 
rule.28 The opinion further characterizes the debate among the members 
of the Court as a “warm one,” and criticizes the rule’s deterrence effect as 
unsupported by empirical evidence.29 While deterrence was but one 
rationale supporting the holding in Mapp, the Court synthesized its 
existing jurisprudence to hold that the rule is only applicable when 
necessary to serve the deterrence purpose.30 However, Janis need not 
have led the Court down the path of permitting illegally seized evidence 
in criminal proceedings. After all, a key factor to the analysis in Janis was 
that the case was a civil proceeding, and the exclusionary rule was drafted 
with criminal prosecutions in mind.31 That limitation would not hold for 
long. 
Just a few years later, the Court extended the good faith exception to 
the criminal context in United States v. Leon.32 In that case, like in Janis, 
an officer relied on a warrant to execute a search, this time seizing drugs 
from the defendant.33 A district court held that the warrant lacked 
probable cause and suppressed the evidence, rejecting the government’s 
good faith reliance argument.34 On review, the Supreme Court chose to 
recognize the good faith exception in the criminal context.35 In so holding, 
the Court weighed the societal cost of excluding otherwise relevant 
evidence of criminal wrongdoing against the potential deterrent effect of 
the exclusionary rule to discourage police misconduct.36 As stated in 
Leon, the good faith exception had two requirements: first, the officer’s 
reliance on the magistrate’s determination of probable cause must be 
objectively reasonable;  and second, the officer must not have misled the 
magistrate in any way to obtain the warrant.37 
The good-faith exception was the result of a string of decisions that 
retreated from Mapp’s language suggesting broad application of the 
exclusionary rule in favor of a balancing test  to determine whether 
exclusion was the best way to deter the police conduct at issue. Again, no 
longer was deterrence one of several supporting rationales for the rule—
it was the rationale for the rule. The new exception permitted the 
introduction of illegally seized information except where the officer either 
 
 28. Id. at 443.   
 29. Id. at 446. 
 30. Id. at 448. 
 31. Id. at 459 (concluding that the civil proceeding before the court did not justify the “drastic 
measure” of the exclusionary rule.) 
 32. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 922. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 923. 
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fraudulently obtains the warrant, or the warrant itself is so poorly drafted 
that no reasonable person would view the warrant as sufficient—a far cry 
from the Court’s proclamation in Mapp that the exclusionary rule was 
fundamental to the enforcement of the Fourth Amendment. The good faith 
exception and the interest-balancing approach employed by the Court 
would extend to a variety of other contexts—for example, to permit 
evidence illegally seized in reliance on an unconstitutional state law,38 
and where an officer relied on a police database that erroneously showed 
an outstanding arrest warrant, giving rise to an illegal arrest and 
subsequent discovery of incriminating evidence.39 
Over time, the exclusionary rule came under even more exacting 
scrutiny and more skeptical framing by Justices authoring opinions 
delineating its purpose and scope. To an even greater extent than Janis 
and Leon, later exclusionary rule cases would come to be marked by 
discussion of the rule’s deterrent purpose and the Court’s seemingly 
begrudging acceptance of the rule as a “last resort” remedy, only desirable 
where its deterrent purpose outweighs the costs it inflicts on the truth-
seeking function of judicial proceedings.40 Justice Scalia, writing for a 
five-to-four majority in Hudson v. Michigan, recounted this trend before 
acknowledging so-called dicta in Mapp v. Ohio that suggested broad 
application of the rule.41 The Court held in Hudson that a violation of the 
knock-and-announce principal, which requires officers to knock on the 
door and allow a reasonable time to pass before forcibly entering a 
building pursuant to a warrant, does not give rise to exclusion of 
evidence.42 While Mapp proclaimed that “all evidence obtained in 
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a 
state court,”43 the Justices of the Court weaponized Mapp’s use of the 
deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule as a tool of the rule’s 
destruction.  
 
 38. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987) (holding that officer’s reliance on a statute requiring 
motorists to allow police inspection of records without a warrant was reasonable and did not warrant 
suppression of evidence). 
 39. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (officer ran motorist’s license and, due to a clerical error 
in a police database, erroneously found that there was an outstanding warrant leading to arrest. The Court 
held that the evidence seized incident to the arrest should not be suppressed due to the officer’s good faith 
reliance on the police database). 
 40. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“Suppression of evidence, however, has 
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”). 
 41. Id. In fact, the pronouncement that “all evidence” seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
was not dicta, but the core holding of Mapp. 
 42. Id. at 589 (describing the Court’s adoption of the “ancient” common law knock-and-announce 
rule). 
 43. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
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C. State Constitutionalism. 
Perhaps sensing the oncoming changing of the guard from the rights-
expansionist Warren Court to the decidedly more restrained Courts that 
would follow in the coming decades,  in 1977 Justice William Brennan 
published one of the most influential pieces of literature in the area of 
state constitutional law, titled State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights.44 In this article, Justice Brennan recounted the 
paradigm shift occurring during the 1960’s and 1970’s wherein state 
courts were required to interpret federal constitutional law with a 
frequency never before seen as a result of the Court’s recent decisions 
expanding federally-recognized individual rights beyond the thresholds 
of state protection.45 “In the beginning of this legal revolution,” said 
Justice Brennan regarding the expansion of federal statutory law under 
the New Deal, “federal law was not a major concern of state judges.”46 
Later, however, “another variety of federal law—that fundamental law 
protecting all of us from the use of governmental powers in ways 
inconsistent with American concepts of human liberty—has dramatically 
altered the grist of the state courts.”47 In particular, Justice Brennan gave 
special recognition to the Warren Court’s decisions on the criminal 
process for the considerable, unprecedented attention they required from 
state courts.48  
In the midst of this “legal revolution,” Justice Brennan showed no 
restraint in issuing a call to arms encouraging state courts to continue the 
charge in expanding individual rights protections:  
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full 
protections of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font 
of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those 
required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal 
revolution which has brought federal law to the fore must not be allowed 
to inhibit the independent protective force of state law--for without it, the 
full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.49 
After recounting the Supreme Court’s retreat from the broad 
declarations of rights protections pronounced in some of the Warren 
Court’s landmark cases, as well as the growing tendency of the Court to 
close the doors to federal courthouses by disposing of cases on grounds 
 
 44. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489 (1977). 
 45. Id. at 492. 
 46. Id. at 490. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 492. 
 49. Id. at 491. 
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of justiciability and standing, Justice Brennan turned his attention to 
another emergent trend in the law. Post-incorporation50 of certain 
provisions in the Bill of Rights, many state courts were interpreting their 
own constitutions to provide greater individual rights protections than the 
federal constitution—in some cases, outright rejecting the Supreme 
Court’s opinions as unpersuasive as a matter of state law.51 This, the 
Justice concluded, was a positive development in American law and 
represented a healthy form of federalism.52 Justice Brennan argued that 
the increasing tendency of states to provide greater protections presented 
a different picture than the conventional narrative of states depriving 
citizens of their rights and the federal government stepping in—one where 
states, not the federal government, fill the role of chief protectors of 
individual rights against government action.53 The then-recent federal 
decisions foreclosing federal remedies for individual rights violations, 
Justice Brennan argued, called for state courts to step into the breach by 
expansively interpreting their own constitutions.54  
In the search and seizure context, many state courts are hesitant to 
depart from Supreme Court precedent in interpreting their constitutions’ 
equivalents of the Fourth Amendment, despite there being no legal 
principal stopping them from doing so. Generally, states adopt one of 
three approaches. First, some state courts interpret their analogues to the 
Fourth Amendment identically and follow the Supreme Court lockstep. 
Eighteen states use this approach.55 Second, some states closely track 
federal Fourth Amendment precedent in state constitutional jurisprudence 
but depart from federal precedent when a sufficiently compelling 
justification exists.56 Thirteen states, including Ohio, follow this 
approach—although some states who claim to follow this approach seem 
unwilling to follow through on their claimed willingness to depart from 
the Fourth Amendment. Third, some state courts proclaim that they are 
completely untethered from the Fourth Amendment in how they choose 
to interpret their constitution’s search and seizure provision. Nineteen 
 
 50. “Incorporation” refers to the Supreme Court’s application of the Bill of Rights against the 
states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 
U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (“We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our prior cases, that a 
provision of the Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair trial’ is made obligatory upon 
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding 
that the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights.”).  
 51. Brennan, supra note 44, at 495. 
 52. Id. at 502. 
 53. Id. at 495. 
 54. Id. at 503. 
 55. This number comes from an analysis of a survey of state constitutional search and seizure 
provisions, and their respective state courts’ interpretation relative to the Fourth Amendment.  
See Michael J. Gorman, Survey: State Search and Seizure Analogs, 77 MISS. L.J. 417 (2007). 
 56. See, e.g., State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997) (“Robinette II”). 
9
Bushle: Search and Seizure Law Under the Ohio Constitution
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
2021] SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW UNDER THE OHIO CONSTITUTION 539 
states follow this approach,57 many of which are the original thirteen 
colonies whose state constitutions predate the Constitution’s ratification. 
E. Search and Seizure Jurisprudence under the Ohio Constitution. 
The Ohio Constitution contains a search and seizure analogue that is 
nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment. Article I, Section 14 of the 
Ohio Constitution states:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
possessions, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the person and things to be seized.58  
As one might infer from the name of the case in Mapp v. Ohio, Ohio 
did not adopt a broad exclusionary rule of its own accord.59 Prior to Mapp, 
Ohio only “sometimes” excluded illegally obtained evidence, but 
generally adopted the view of most state courts prior to Mapp—that courts 
need not concern themselves with the collateral matter of how evidence 
was obtained, provided that the evidence was relevant.60 Ohio’s prior rule 
was to only exclude illegally obtained evidence if the state engaged in 
“brutal or offensive” physical force in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when obtaining the evidence.61 Thus, even when Ohio courts 
did exclude illegally obtained evidence prior to Mapp, they did not do so 
pursuant to Article I, Section 14, but rather under one of the only federal 
constitutional provisions at the time that explicitly applied to state 
government action. 
There is scant Ohio case law specifically dealing with the exclusionary 
rule solely under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio constitution. However, 
after Mapp v. Ohio’s incorporation of the exclusionary rule onto the 
states, in a series of fairly recent decisions, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
has articulated its general approach to construing Article I, Section 14 in 
relation to the Fourth Amendment. First, in State v. Robinette (“Robinette 
II”), the court pronounced that it would “harmonize” its interpretation of 
Article I, Section 14 with the Fourth Amendment unless “persuasive 
reasons” justify recognizing more expansive protection under the state 
constitution.62 In that case, the court adopted the Supreme Court’s holding 
 
 57. See generally Gorman, supra note 55. 
 58. OHIO CONST. Art. I, §14. 
 59. State v. Bembry, 90 N.E.3d 891, 895 (Ohio 2017) (describing Ohio’s inconsistent and 
infrequent use of the exclusion remedy prior to Mapp). 
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 985. 
 62. Robinette II, 685 N.E.2d 762, 767 (Ohio 1997). 
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in Whren v. United States63 that an officer’s subjective motivation for a 
traffic stop is irrelevant to whether prolonging the stop is reasonable. The 
court also abandoned its earlier proposed first-tell-then-ask rule from its 
prior ruling in Robinette I that would have required officers to inform 
stopped motorists that they are free to leave before asking for consent to 
search a vehicle during a traffic stop, instead falling in line with the 
Supreme Court’s totality-of-the-circumstances approach to whether 
consent was given voluntarily.64  
In several later decisions, however, the Supreme Court of Ohio held 
firm on its rulings that conflicted with the U.S. Supreme Court. In State 
v. Brown (“Brown I”), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that Article I, 
Section 14 offers greater protection than the Fourth Amendment by 
prohibiting full arrests for minor misdemeanors.65 Over a decade later, in 
another case named State v. Brown (“Brown II”), the court reaffirmed 
Brown I in holding that a traffic stop for a minor misdemeanor outside of 
the arresting officer’s jurisdiction violated the defendant’s rights under 
Article I, Section 14, while recognizing that such arrests might not violate 
the Fourth Amendment.66 Because the stop itself violated the defendant’s 
Ohio Constitutional rights, the court held that the evidence seized during 
ensuing arrest and search should be suppressed.67 
The Supreme Court of Ohio does not always choose to expansively 
interpret its constitution—particularly when the exclusionary rule is 
involved. In State v. Bembry, the court considered whether a violation of 
the knock-and-announce principal should lead to suppression under 
Article I, Section 14.68 Relying primarily on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
deterrence rationale analysis from Hudson v. Michigan, the court 
concluded that the exclusionary rule should not apply.69 In so holding, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio uncritically accepted the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
begrudging characterization of the exclusionary rule as a last resort 
remedy that exacts a significant societal toll.70 In this regard, the Ohio 
high court’s reasoning largely restated the same considerations put forth 
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hudson, and did not address in a wider 
sense whether the Ohio exclusionary rule should serve a purpose other 
than deterrence alone.71 
 
 63. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996). 
 64. Robinette II, 685 N.E.2d at 769. 
 65. 792 N.E.2d 175 (Ohio 2003). 
 66. State v. Brown, 39 N.E.3d 496, 501 (Ohio 2015) (“Brown II”). 
 67. Id.at 502.  
 68. 90 N.E.3d 891 (Ohio 2017).  
 69. Id. at 900. 
 70. Id. at 897. 
 71. Id. at 898. The court concluded that “suppression will not effectively deter knock-and-
announce violations,” but fails to explain whether exclusion would vindicate a citizen’s privacy rights 
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While the Supreme Court of Ohio had already adopted the good-faith 
exception under the state constitution in the 1986 case State v. Wilmoth,72 
that decision hardly rested on independent state law grounds. Wilmoth 
almost exclusively discussed the good-faith exception in terms of federal 
case law and mostly cited Ohio decisions that did the same. The dissent 
in Wilmoth took note of this failure to discuss the state constitution, 
lamenting that the majority’s holding would reduce Article I, Section 14 
to a mere “form of words.”73 The majority, however, did not respond to 
this concern. Thus, Bembry, unlike Wilmoth, is a rare case where Supreme 
Court of Ohio addressed the contours of the exclusionary rule by 
explicitly discussing Article I, Section 14’s independent authority.  
In Bembry, the police violated the state’s knock-and-announce statute74 
while executing an otherwise valid search warrant of a suspected drug 
trafficker’s home.75 The trial court granted a motion to suppress the 
evidence seized, holding that violation of the knock-and-announce 
principal was unreasonable under Article I, Section 14.76 The Ohio Court 
of Appeals reversed, accepting the State’s argument that it was “well-
settled” under Hudson that the exclusionary rule does not apply to 
violations of the knock-and-announce principle, while making no 
mention of the independent authority of Article I, Section 14 versus the 
Fourth Amendment.77 On review, the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed 
and held that the exclusionary rule should not apply to violations of the 
knock-and-announce principle. 78  
II. DISCUSSION 
Although the Supreme Court of Ohio purported to create a consistent 
rule in Robinette II regarding its intent to harmonize Article I, Section 14 
with the Fourth Amendment, subsequent decisions of the court offer no 
guidance on what is a “persuasive reason” to depart from federal law.  
Decisions like Brown I and Brown II, which expanded protection under 
 
independent of the rule’s deterrent effect. 
 72. 490 N.E.2d 1236 (Ohio 1986). 
 73. Id. at 1249 (Sweeny, J., dissenting). 
 74. “When making an arrest or executing an arrest warrant or summons in lieu of an arrest warrant, 
or when executing a search warrant, the peace officer, law enforcement officer, or other authorized 
individual making the arrest or executing the warrant or summons may break down an outer or inner door 
or window of a dwelling house or other building, if, after notice of his intention to make the arrest or to 
execute the warrant or summons, he is refused admittance, but the law enforcement officer or other 
authorized individual executing a search warrant shall not enter a house or building not described in the 
warrant.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2935.12(A) (LexisNexis 2020). 
 75. Bembry, 90 N.E.3d at 893. 
 76. Id. at 894. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Id. at 893.  
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the Ohio constitution, do little more than put forth their own, different 
rationale as independently persuasive. Meanwhile, decisions like 
Robinette II and Bembry, where the court harmonizes its rationale with 
the Fourth Amendment, do little more than put forth the Supreme Court’s 
rationale as independently persuasive without explaining what makes 
those cases different from ones like Brown I and II. 
When applied to the exclusionary rule, the Robinette II framework also 
does not stand up to history. Prior to Mapp—a case which forced the 
exclusionary rule on the states by incorporation of the Fourth 
Amendment—Ohio had no exclusionary rule. If Article I, Section 14 was 
truly intended to mean the same thing as the Fourth Amendment in all 
significant respects, the Supreme Court of Ohio might have adopted the 
rule from Weeks after it was decided in 1914—but the court did not. This 
is because the exclusionary rule is admittedly a pragmatic judicial 
creation, untethered by the text of the Fourth Amendment or even the 
intent of its drafters. Considerations affecting the rule’s scope, costs, 
benefits, and rationale are, therefore, entirely up to judge-performed 
interest balancing. By uncritically accepting the Supreme Court’s 
rationale on these points, the Supreme Court of Ohio misses an 
opportunity to truly untether itself from the Supreme Court and exercise 
its full power as an independent court. Therefore, the court should put 
forth more concrete guiding principles to aid litigants arguing for a 
different interpretation of Article I, Section 14’s exclusionary rule—one 
which is based on Ohio’s law, history, and experiences, and not the 
musings of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. 
A. State v. Robinette: The Supreme Court of Ohio purports to provide a 
guiding principal for litigants to argue for more expansive protection 
under Article I, Section 14.  
In the decades after Mapp was decided, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
seemed open to the idea of interpreting the Ohio Constitution as providing 
broader protection than its federal counterpart.79 However, in practice, the 
court’s use of this principal has been inconsistent and highly deferential 
to the U.S. Supreme Court when it comes to the Fourth Amendment. One 
of the most extensive discussions of the scope Article I, Section 14 of the 
Ohio Constitution versus the Fourth Amendment came from the court’s 
1997 decision in Robinette II, a case which dealt not with the exclusionary 
 
 79. See, e.g., Arnold v. Cleveland, 616 N.E.2d 163, 169 (Ohio 1993) (“In joining the growing 
trend in other states, we believe that the Ohio Constitution is a document of independent force. In the 
areas of individual rights and civil liberties, the United States Constitution, where applicable to the states, 
provides a floor below which state court decisions may not fall.”). 
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rule, but with the reasonableness of a traffic stop.80 Robert Robinette was 
pulled over by a police officer for speeding in a construction zone and 
asked to exit his vehicle.81 The officer decided not to issue a ticket for the 
speeding, instead issuing only a verbal warning. However, the encounter 
did not end there: the officer asked Robinette if the car contained any 
contraband or weapons, to which Robinette answered that it did not.82 The 
officer then asked Robinette if he could search the car.83 Not believing he 
was at liberty to refuse, Robinette “automatically answered yes.”84 Inside 
the car the officer found a pill of MDMA, and Robinette was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance.85  
In its first decision on the case,86 the Supreme Court of Ohio held that 
the officer’s continued detention of Robinette after the verbal warning 
was an illegal seizure because, according to the court, the officer should 
have first informed Robinette that he was legally free to leave, or 
something to that effect, before asking for permission to search the car.87 
While the court purported to decide the opinion on both state and federal 
grounds, the opinion in Robinette I made no statement at all about the 
difference in scope between the Fourth Amendment and Ohio’s Article I, 
Section 14.88 In fact, the court cited only one Ohio case, State v. 
Chatton,89 to support the proposition that an officer must tailor his 
detention of a driver during a traffic stop to the reason the stop was made, 
unless “articulable facts” justify otherwise.90 Aside from Chatton, every 
other case cited in Robinette I was a federal case decided under the Fourth 
Amendment. The court pronounced the broad holding of Robinette I in 
paragraphs one and two of the syllabus:91 
 
 80. 685 N.E.2d762, 762 (Ohio 1997). 
 81. Id. at 764.  
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. State v. Robinette, 653 N.E.2d 695 (Ohio 1995), rev’d sub nom. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 
33 (1996), remanded sub nom. to State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997) (hereinafter “Robinette 
I”). 
 87. Id. at 699. 
 88. The court did not mention the legal authority it decided the case on until the last two paragraphs 
of the opinion. Id. (“Therefore, we are convinced that the right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio 
Constitutions . . . The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio 
Constitution exist to protect citizens against such an unreasonable interference with their liberty.”).  
 89. 463 N.E.2d 1237 (Ohio 1984). 
 90. Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 697. 
 91. While practices in other jurisdictions differ, at the time of this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
“[spoke] as a court only through the syllabi of its cases.” Thus, the syllabus of an Ohio Supreme Court 
case was binding authority on Ohio courts. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 37 (1996). This practice 
has since changed, where the syllabus and majority opinion text now both form the statement of law. See 
OHIO SUP. CT. REP. OP. R. 2.3, 2.4. 
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1. When the motivation behind a police officer's continued detention of a 
person stopped for a traffic violation is not related to the purpose of the 
original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based 
on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal 
activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention 
constitutes an illegal seizure. 
 
2. The right, guaranteed by the federal and Ohio Constitutions, to be secure 
in one's person and property requires that citizens stopped for traffic 
offenses be clearly informed by the detaining officer when they are free to 
go after a valid detention, before an officer attempts to engage in a 
consensual interrogation. Any attempt at consensual interrogation must be 
preceded by the phrase “At this time you legally are free to go” or by words 
of similar import.92  
Regarding paragraph one, the United States Supreme Court shortly 
came to a different legal conclusion in Whren v. United States.93 In that 
case, the Supreme Court held that an officer’s subjective motivation for 
making a traffic stop is not relevant when an objective justification exists, 
permitting so-called pretextual traffic stops that lead to searches unrelated 
to the stop’s original purpose.94 Surely enough, after granting certiorari,  
the Court reversed the Supreme Court of Ohio.95 Additionally, based on 
prior federal cases, the Supreme Court overruled the per se rule in 
paragraph two requiring an officer to warn a detained driver that they are 
free to go when the legal justification for a traffic stop has ended, based 
on prior federal cases holding instead that courts should apply a totality-
of-the-circumstances approach to determine whether a purported 
consensual search is valid.96 Notably, in concluding that it had 
jurisdiction to hear the case,97 the Supreme Court cited the Ohio court’s 
failure to effectively delineate between state and federal law beyond 
generalities in its opinion.98 This failure led the Court to conclude that the 
case presented a federal Fourth Amendment question, rather than a 
nonreviewable state law question.99  
On remand, the Supreme Court of Ohio took the initiative to ask the 
parties to brief the issue of whether its prior decision should be upheld 
 
 92. Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d at 696. 
 93. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Robinette II, 685 N.E. 2d 762, 765 (Ohio 1997). 
 96. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 39 (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)). 
 97. Under the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, the Supreme Court will only hear 
an appeal from a state court if the case necessarily turns on a federal question of law. See, e.g., Murdock 
v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590 (1875). 
 98. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 37 (noting that both the body and the syllabus of the opinion make only 
general references to the state and federal constitutional provisions). 
 99. Id. 
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solely under Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio constitution.100 The result 
of that effort, Robinette II, was a mixed bag. On both paragraphs one and 
two of the Robinette I syllabus, the court fell in line with the Supreme 
Court’s rule statements instead of returning to its prior ruling. 
Specifically, the court modified the syllabus of its opinion to read: 
1. When the motivation behind a police officer's continued detention of a 
person stopped for a traffic violation is not related to the purpose of the 
original, constitutional stop, and when that continued detention is not based 
on any articulable facts giving rise to a suspicion of some separate illegal 
activity justifying an extension of the detention, the continued detention 
constitutes an illegal seizure. 
 
2. Under Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, the totality-of-the 
circumstances test is controlling in an unlawful detention to determine 
whether permission to search a vehicle is voluntary.101 
Luckily for Robert Robinette, even using the federal test, the Supreme 
Court of Ohio upheld the result of the case.102 The court concluded that 
although the officer was justified in ordering Robinette out of the car, his 
continued detention of Robinette was not based on any articulable facts 
and was therefore illegal.103 Next, applying the totality-of-the-
circumstances test to the purported consensual search, the court 
concluded that the power imbalance between an officer and a citizen who 
is unexpectedly ordered to step out of his car indicated that Robinette 
would not have felt at liberty to say “no” to the search request.104 Thus, 
the search still violated Robinette’s right against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. 
There are two notable things in Robinette II. First, the court was 
reluctant to stand its ground on paragraph one of the syllabus, despite the 
fact that it was entirely consistent with Fourth Amendment and Ohio 
precedent when it was decided, and was not contradicted by federal law 
until after it was decided. Presumably, the court had surveyed and 
analyzed state and federal search-and-seizure jurisprudence as it stood 
before it decided the case. After such careful review, the Supreme Court 
of Ohio must have concluded (in its first opinion) that an officer must 
tailor  actions during a traffic stop to the stop’s original purpose. Why 
does the mere fact that the Supreme Court came to a different conclusion 
justify the court declining to hold to its prior opinion where it has the 
power to do so? The answer, according to the court, was that Ohio has a 
 
 100. Robinette II, 685 N.E.2d at 766. 
 101. Id. at 762. 
 102. Id. at 771-72. 
 103. Id. at 768-69. 
 104. Id. at 771-72. 
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tradition of interpreting Article I, Section 14 as coextensive with the 
Fourth Amendment because of their nearly identical language.105 The 
court thus concluded that it should “harmonize [its] interpretation of 
Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution with the Fourth 
Amendment, unless there are persuasive reasons to find otherwise.”106 
This rule is the foundation of the Supreme Court of Ohio’s inconsistent 
approach to independent interpretation of the Ohio search and seizure 
provision. In no case since Robinette II has the court clarified what a 
“persuasive reason” looks like; there are simply cases where the Ohio 
court agrees with the Supreme Court, and those where it does not.107 
The second notable aspect of Robinette II from a state constitutional 
perspective is that the court abandoned the per se informed-consent rule 
apparently solely because the Supreme Court had rejected such a rule in 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.108 Schneckloth had been on the books for over 
two decades by the time the Ohio court handed down its opinion in 
Robinette I. One can only wonder, assuming the court was aware of 
Schneckloth at the time it decided Robinette I, how the court could view 
its prior ruling consistently with a case that already expressly rejected a 
near-identical proposed rule? Schneckloth is not cited at all in Robinette I 
outside of the dissent,109 yet the majority discusses it at length in 
Robinette II.110 Thus, had the Ohio court not had the Supreme Court’s 
influence hanging over it, the Justices clearly believed that reasonable 
grounds existed for a bright-line informed consent rule two years earlier. 
C. Brown I and Brown II: The Supreme Court of Ohio held that Ohio’s 
search and seizure provision provides greater protection than the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Several years after the Robinette saga, the Supreme Court of Ohio 
departed from federal caselaw in Brown I.111 In that case, the court held 
that Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution provides greater 
protection than the Fourth Amendment against a warrantless arrest for a 
minor misdemeanor.112 However, to understand the significance of that 
departure, the timeline of cases preceding Brown I is important. Three 
years earlier in State v. Jones, the court held that, absent a statutory 
 
 105. Id. at 767. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See infra Part III-D. 
 108. 412 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 109. Robinette I, 653 N.E.2d 695, 699-700 (Ohio 1995) (Sweeny, J., dissenting). 
 110. See Robinette II, 685 N.E.2d at 769. 
 111. 792 N.E.2d 175 (Ohio 2003). 
 112. Id. 
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exception, both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 protect 
civilians from full custodial arrests for minor misdemeanor offenses and 
that evidence seized from such arrests must be excluded, subject to a 
balancing test of the citizens’ right to be free from arrest and the 
government’s law enforcement interest.113 Shortly after Jones, the 
Supreme Court held in Atwater v. Lago Vista that such arrests—even for 
regulatory traffic offenses—are not unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.114 This was the same posture as Robinette, where the Ohio 
court came to a more protective rule which was later contradicted by a 
Supreme Court holding. 
The State asked the Supreme Court of Ohio in Brown I to reconsider 
Jones in light of Atwater.115 Given how Robinette II turned out, with the 
court showing strong reluctance to depart from federal caselaw, the State 
must have felt confident in its chances. However, this time the Supreme 
Court of Ohio held firm to its prior ruling. The court upheld the balancing 
test from Jones.116 While the court cited Robinette II’s purported rule that 
it should “harmonize” its interpretation of the state provision with the 
federal unless “persuasive reasons” justify otherwise, it resolved this 
apparently weighty inquiry in two terse sentences: 
We find that the balancing test set forth in Jones provides ample reason for 
holding that Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution provides greater 
protection than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
against warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors. Thus, Jones is still 
authoritative as to the Ohio Constitution.117 
The court in Brown I seemed much more willing to simply defer to its 
prior holding as persuasive in its own right rather than seriously grappling 
with the reasoning put forth by the Supreme Court in its adverse holding 
in Atwater.  
Then-Justice Maureen O’Connor, who would later become Chief 
Justice, dissented. She argued that the arrest in question did not violate 
the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 14; that the arrest only 
violated an Ohio statute that prohibited warrantless arrests absent a 
specific exception; and that the exclusionary rule did not apply to 
statutory violations alone.118 On the constitutional question, Justice 
O’Connor observed that the federal and state search and seizure 
provisions are “virtually identical,” and that “[a]ny difference in the 
 
 113. 727 N.E.2d 886, 888 (Ohio 2000) (modified in part by Brown I, 792 N.E.2d at 175). 
 114. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 115. Brown I, 792 N.E.2d at 177. 
 116. Id. at 178. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 179 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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protections afforded by them is due strictly to judicial interpretation.”119 
The dissenting Justice further justified harmonizing the Ohio provision 
with the Fourth Amendment on the grounds that the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Atwater was “not unreasonable” and “does not infringe on the 
rights of citizens,” and that it is “illogical to suggest that a nearly identical 
Ohio constitutional provision” would prohibit conduct permitted by the 
Fourth Amendment.120 
The Supreme Court of Ohio reaffirmed Brown I over a decade later in 
a case fittingly called State v. Brown (“Brown II”).121 In Brown II, a 
municipal police officer made a highway traffic stop leading to a 
warrantless arrest.122 The arrest violated an Ohio statute that gave 
exclusive jurisdiction over highway traffic stops to the state highway 
patrol123—a different statute than the one at issue in Jones and Brown I.  
The State attempted to distinguish the case from Brown I by arguing that 
violation of the highway jurisdictional statute did not amount to a 
constitutional violation, and thus the exclusionary rule should not 
apply.124 The State also invoked the same argument made in the Brown I 
dissent that Article I, Section 14 and the Fourth Amendment are virtually 
identical and should be read in harmony.125 The court disagreed. It cited 
common law and statutory traditions from Ohio dating back to the mid-
nineteenth century indicating that extraterritorial arrests were long 
considered unlawful, connecting the Ohio statute at issue to that 
tradition.126 Comparing the case to Brown I, where it similarly found 
overlap between constitutional and statutory arrest violations, the court 
concluded that the highway stop in Brown II violated Article I, Section 
14 of the Ohio Constitution.127 The majority opinion makes no mention 
of the Robinette II “persuasive reasons” framework, nor did the court 
entertain rethinking its decision in Brown I. Curiously, Chief Justice 
O’Connor concurred with the majority in Brown II.  
Thus far, these decisions have not dealt with the exclusionary rule’s 
scope, but instead have only dealt with the Ohio search and seizure 
provision generally. This discussion seeks to ascertain the principles on 
which the Supreme Court of Ohio bases its decisions on whether to 
“harmonize” Article I, Section 14 with the Fourth Amendment, or 
 
 119. Id. at 179-80. 
 120. Id. at 180. 
 121. Brown II, 39 N.E.3d 496, 496 (Ohio 2015). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4513.39 (LexisNexis 2020). 
 124. Brown II, 39 N.E.3d at 498. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 499-500. 
 127. Id. at 500. 
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conclude that the state provision offers greater protection. According to 
Robinette II, the court interpreted the two provisions coextensively unless 
“persuasive reasons” justify a departure. However, in Brown I, almost in 
summary fashion, the court dismissed a contrary federal Supreme Court 
holding to stand firm on its prior ruling. Finally, in Brown II, the court 
applied an originalist-type analysis of antebellum common law principles 
to justify its recognition of a protection created under Article I, Section 
14—a move it has not even remotely explored in the other search and 
seizure cases discussed herein. It is therefore difficult to tell what 
justifications the court considers “persuasive” under the Robinette 
framework when such little analysis justifies its decision to depart from 
the Fourth Amendment in Brown I, and where the court used yet another 
unique analytical framework in Brown II.  
D. Bembry: The Supreme Court of Ohio addresses the exclusionary rule 
under the Ohio Constitution. 
Keeping these principles in mind, the Supreme Court of Ohio’s 
rationale in refusing to expansively interpret Article I, Section 14 in 
Bembry is internally inconsistent and further complicates matters. The 
defendants offered three potential justifications for more expansive 
protection under Article I, Section 14. First, several trial and appellate 
level Ohio courts had already held that suppression is a remedy for a 
knock-and-announce violation.128 Second, they argued that Brown I and 
Brown II supported a more expansive interpretation under the Ohio 
constitution.129 And third, they argued that other state courts, which the 
defendants offered as persuasive authority, had resisted adopting Hudson 
in similar cases.130 The court dismissed the first point on the grounds that 
it was simply not bound by lower court decisions and, in any event, that 
the decisions cited expressly relied on the Fourth Amendment. Next, the 
court distinguished the case from Brown I and Brown II by pointing out 
that those cases concerned warrantless arrests, while the officers in 
Bembry had a valid warrant.131 Finally, the court dismissed the decisions 
of other states simply because the rationale of Husdon was, in the court’s 
words, “far more persuasive.”132 
The court’s reason for rejecting the Ohio lower court decisions 
undermines the Robinette framework. That framework presumes that the 
Fourth Amendment and the Article I, Section 14 should be interpreted the 
 
 128. State v. Bembry, 90 N.E.3d 891, 899 (Ohio 2017).  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 899-900. 
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same because their language is near-identical. If anything, the fact that the 
trial and appellate courts interpreted the Ohio search and seizure provision 
as requiring suppression only strengthens the conclusion that Article I, 
Section 14 should provide for suppression in a knock and announce 
violation. If an Ohio court reaches one conclusion on an exclusionary 
question, and a federal court reaches a different conclusion, this is not 
evidence that the Ohio court “got it wrong.” These decisions are balancing 
tests, where courts weight the societal costs of exclusion against a 
citizen’s privacy interest. Differing state and federal outcomes are 
evidence that Ohio courts’ interpretation of search and seizure law simply 
values citizens’ privacy interests differently than federal courts.  
As for the persuasive value of the other state courts’ decisions, the court 
in Bembry all but summarily rejected those decisions simply because they 
were from other states, which could be said for any interstate 
constitutional question. Accordingly, unless the court never plans to refer 
to another state’s case law on a constitutional issue in the future, this 
should not necessarily dispose of the persuasive value of such decisions. 
The court appeared to simply adopt Hudson, and with it, all of the 
Supreme Court’s accumulated balancing of the costs and benefits of the 
exclusionary rule, without performing any independent balancing under 
Ohio law. Bembry was a failure of the court to clearly articulate how 
exactly the defendants’ three independent rationales for greater protection 
under the Ohio Constitution—bolstered by Ohio caselaw—fell short of 
being “persuasive reasons” under Robinette II. The only clear supporting 
rationale appears to be that the result would contradict the United States 
Supreme Court’s prior holding, and that the Court would disagree with 
the result. This is an abrogation of the duty of a state court judge. Who 
should know better what the Ohio Constitution requires in its protection 
of its citizens’ privacy interests—Ohio judges elected by citizens of Ohio, 
or the nine federally-appointed Justices of the Supreme Court? 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Culminating with the decision in Bembry, Ohio’s search and seizure 
jurisprudence illustrates the confusion that results when litigants and state 
courts do not adequately explain the difference between state 
constitutional provisions and their federal counterparts. Ohio only 
adopted an exclusionary rule at the behest of the Supreme Court to begin 
with; it did not do so independently—undermining the Supreme Court of 
Ohio’s position that Article I, Section 14 was intended to mean the same 
thing as the Fourth Amendment simply because their language is virtually 
identical. The exclusionary rule is not rooted in the language of either the 
Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 14. It is a judicial creation 
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designed to vindicate the rights guaranteed by the text. Any expansion or 
retraction of its protections, therefore, are entirely up to judicial interest 
balancing, which only strengthens the case for state independence in this 
area. 
It makes little sense, then, for a state court to hitch itself to the Supreme 
Court’s wagon when ruling on such philosophical issues as the efficacy 
of the exclusionary rule. The Supreme Court of Ohio must articulate 
clearer criteria for what reasons it would consider “persuasive” in 
choosing to depart from federal law in order to allow litigants to better 
develop this area of the law. One such approach could be an originalist, 
historically oriented approach, as in Brown I. Perhaps the court could hold 
that Ohio lower court decisions can be instructive, despite the court’s 
dismissal of them in Bembry. Currently, the court’s decisions are 
conspicuously unclear, creating the impression that the sole criterion for 
whether a departure from federal law is persuasive is whether the Justices 
of the Supreme Court of Ohio agree with the majority or the dissenting 
opinion of an analogous federal Supreme Court case. If the Supreme 
Court of Ohio does not fill these gaps and give litigants the tools to 
effectively argue for an independent Ohio Constitution, then one of 
Ohio’s most crucial provisions protecting its citizens against government 
overreach is at risk of becoming nothing more than a form of words. 
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